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Abstract—The fuzzy vault is an error tolerant au-
thentication method that ensures the privacy of the
stored reference data. Several publications have pro-
posed the application of the fuzzy vault to fingerprints,
but the results of subsequent analyses indicate that a
single finger does not contain sufficient information for
a secure implementation.
In this contribution, we present an implementation of
a fuzzy vault based on minutiae information in several
fingerprints aiming at a security level comparable to
current cryptographic applications. We analyze and
empirically evaluate the security, efficiency, and ro-
bustness of the construction and several optimizations.
The results allow an assessment of the capacity of the
scheme and an appropriate selection of parameters.
Finally, we report on a practical simulation conducted
with ten users.
This article represents a full version of [1], copyright
of Gesellschaft fu¨r Informatik (GI).
I. Introduction
Biometric authentication requires the storage of refer-
ence data for identity verification, either centrally (e.g., in
a database) or locally (e.g., on the users token). However,
the storage of biometric reference data poses considerable
information security risks to the biometric application
and concerns regarding data protection. As a potential
solution to this dilemma, biometric template protection
systems [2] use reference data which reveal only very
limited information on the biometric trait. Another term
frequently used for these schemes is biometric encryption.
One of the most prominent approaches is the fuzzy vault
scheme [3], where the sensitive information (the biometric
reference data) is hidden among random chaff points.
In [4], [5], [6], [7], the application of the fuzzy vault
scheme to minutiae (fuzzy fingerprint vault) has been pro-
posed. However, a subsequent analysis in [8] has revealed
that the parameters suggested do not provide security
beyond 50 bit cryptographic keys. One of the suggestions
in [8] was to enhance security by using multiple fingers.
This idea is supported by the observation in [9] that
a single fingerprint cannot provide enough entropy to
implement a secure biometric template protection. Further
motivation for extending the fuzzy fingerprint vault to
multiple fingers is provided by the analysis carried out in
[10], which shows that the number of minutiae needed to
obtain a provable secure scheme based on the results of
[11] is much larger than the number of minutiae typically
detected on a single fingerprint.
In this paper we present an implementation of a fuzzy
vault based on the minutiae data of several fingerprints.
We investigate the security, efficiency, and robustness of
the scheme and of several optimizations applied, some
of which have already been proposed in the previous
constructions [4], [5], [6], [7]. In particular, we evaluate the
impact of the basic parameters and optimizations to error
rates, efficiency and security, and we derive suggestions
for parameter selection. Furthermore, we evaluate the
practical performance of the scheme in an experiment with
10 users.
This article is structured as follows: In Section II, we
specify the fuzzy multi-fingerprint vault and its optimiza-
tions and justify our design decisions. Section III reca-
pitulates existing security results and contains additional
security analysis of optimizations applied. In Section IV,
we report the results obtained in evaluation with real
fingerprints. Finally, in Section V, we draw conclusions
and identify open issues for future investigations.
II. Design of the scheme
A. Basic biometric feature
We base our biometric feature vectors on minutiae. Since
the minutiae orientations resemble the orientation of the
ridges at the minutiae position, they bear strong depen-
dencies with the minutia location and with the orientation
of other minutiae. Although such dependencies are hard to
quantify, they could be exploited by sophisticated attacks
to effectively reduce the search space. Furthermore, in the
fuzzy vault scheme the stored minutiae are hidden in a
large set of chaff points which must be indistinguishable
from real minutiae; this objective is much harder to achieve
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if minutiae orientations are used as well. For these reasons
we compose the feature vector of the minutiae location
information (and the indexes of the corresponding fingers)
only.
B. Underlying biometric template protection scheme
In the fuzzy vault scheme [3], a polynomial is used to
redundantly encode a set of (pairwise distinct) private
attributes m1, . . . ,mt (e.g., biometric feature data) using
a variant of Reed-Solomon decoding. First, a random
(secret) polynomial P pzq over a finite field Fq with degree
smaller than k is chosen. Then, each attribute mi is
encoded as element xi of the finite field, i.e. xi  Epmiq,
where E is an arbitrary injective map from the space of at-
tributes to Fq. Each of these elements xi is evaluated over
the polynomial, resulting in a list of (pairwise distinct)
pairs pxi, yiq P F2q with yi  P pxiq. In order to hide the
private attributes, r  t chaff points xt 1, . . . , xr P Fq are
randomly selected so that xi  xj for all 1 ¤ i   j ¤ r. For
each chaff point xi, a random yi P Fq with yi  P pxiq is
chosen. The list of all pairs px1, y1q, . . . , pxr, yrq, sorted in
a predetermined order to conceal which points are genuine
and which are the chaff points, is stored as the vault.
For authentication and recovery of the secret polyno-
mial, another set of attributes (the query set) has to be
presented. This set is compared with the stored fuzzy vault
px1, y1q, . . . , pxr, yrq, and those pairs pxi, yiq are selected
for which xi corresponds to an attribute in the query set.
The selected points are then used to try to recover the
secret polynomial using Reed-Solomon decoding.
If the number of genuine points among the identified
correspondences (correct matches) is at least k, the secret
polynomial can be recovered. However, if the set of cor-
respondences also comprises chaff points (false matches),
the number of correct matches must be greater than k,
or the decoding must operate on subsets of the matches
resulting in many trials. Details are given in Section II-G.
In the original fuzzy vault scheme, correspondence be-
tween points in the query set and the fuzzy vault means
equality (of the encodings in the finite field). However,
for the application of the fuzzy vault to fingerprints the
definition of this correspondence is usually adjusted to
allow a compensation of noise in the measurement of the
minutiae. Following the approach of [7] and [6], we define
correspondence as mappings determined by a minutiae
matching algorithm (see Section II-D).
The fuzzy vault scheme is error tolerant with respect
to the set difference metric, which covers exactly the er-
rors introduced to (naively encoded) minutiae information
by insertions, omissions, and permutation of minutiae.
The deployment of a minutiae matching algorithm for
identifying correspondences between the query set and
the fuzzy vault adds robustness with respect to global
rotations and translations or non-linear deformations of
the fingerprint. Since the matching algorithms included in
standard fingerprint software only outputs a match score
and not the list of corresponding minutiae, we use our own
matching algorithm (see Section II-D).
In some cases even a random set of points from the
fuzzy vault will result in the recovery of a polynomial,
but with high probability it will not be the polynomial
P derived from the secret. In order to allow verification
of the correctness of the recovered polynomial, we amend
the scheme by storing a hash value of the polynomial’s
coefficients. If a secure cryptographic hash function is used,
we can assume that the hash value can not be used to
recover the secret polynomial.
C. Multi-biometric fusion
In order to obtain sufficient information for a secure
scheme, we use multiple instances of fingerprints. Specifi-
cally, we use the imprints of f ¥ 2 fingers of each person.
The information extracted from the individual instances
(the fingers used) can be merged at various levels [12]: at
sensor level, feature level, score level, and decision level.
Sensor level fusion introduces additional complexity when
single finger sensors are used, because they need to be
merged after acquisition. On the other hand, score level
fusion and decision level fusion are generally not eligible
for multi-instance biometric template protection, because
it implies the usage of individual secrets (polynomials in
the case of the fuzzy vault) for each feature or instance;
this enables separate brute force attacks on each biometric
instance (in our case on each finger) individually, resulting
only in a linear increase of security with the number of
instances (fingers) used. In contrast, in case of feature
level fusion a single secret key is bound to the merged
information of all instances, and a brute force attack needs
to determine the biometric information of all instances
simultaneously, resulting in an exponential increase of
security with the number of instances.
For these reasons, we implemented feature level fusion
by encoding the minutiae of all fingers in one feature
vector. In this vector each minutiae is encoded as a triplet
pθ, a, bq, where θ P t1, . . . , fu is an index of the finger on
which the minutiae was detected, while a and b denote
the Cartesian coordinates of the minutiae location in the
fingerprint image of the respective finger. Chaff points are
encoded analogously.
D. Minutiae matching algorithm
We need to identify matching minutiae between fin-
gerprints for enrollment and for verification: during en-
rollment minutiae matching is used to identify the most
reliable minutiae from several measurements. During ver-
ification we have to identify a sufficiently large set of
genuine minutiae within the vault to recover the secret
polynomial.
The matching is performed for each finger separately
by a simple matching algorithm that identifies minutiae
correspondences between two sets M and M¯ of points m
(minutiae or chaff points) which are given by their posi-
tions pa, bq in the fingerprint image. The algorithm tries to
maximize the number of correspondent points between the
sets by finding a suitable global rotation and translation
transformation T and tolerates (Euclidean) distances ||||2
between two points smaller than δ, where δ is a parameter
of the algorithm. Further parameters are a tolerance 
for the comparison of distances between minutiae and
the limits for rotation ω and translation S, which are
introduced to limit the computational complexity of the
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Minutiae Matching Algorithm
Input: Sets M  tm1, . . . ,mnu and M¯ 
tm¯1, . . . , m¯n1qu of (minutiae or chaff) points with
mi, m¯i P E .
for all 1 ¤ i   j ¤ n do
Set Dij  ||mi mj ||2.
end for
for all 1 ¤ i1   j1 ¤ n1 do
Set D1i1j1  ||m¯i1  m¯j1 ||2.
end for
for all 1 ¤ i   j ¤ n do
for all i1, j1 with |Dij Di1j1 | ¤  do
Identify the isometry T  pφ,vq so that T pmiq 
m¯i1 and T pmjq  m¯j1 .
if rotation and translation are within the config-
ured limits, i.e., |φ|   ω and }v}2   S then
Apply isometry T to all points in B.
Identify set CT of pairs pmα, T pm¯βqq so that mα
and T pm¯βq have distance smaller than δ and are
the closest matches for each other.
end if
end for
end for
return Isometry T and set of minutiae mappings CT
for which |CT | is maximal.
A pseudo code description is given in Algorithm 1. Since
we apply the minutiae matching algorithm for each finger
separately, no finger index is used.
Our experiments revealed that   0.2, ω  45, and
S  200 (pixels) already yield relatively good matching
results (after pre-alignment of the images as described in
Section II-E6), while larger values increase the running
time considerably without significant improvement of the
matching rate. Therefore, we fixed these parameters to
these values.
The tolerance parameter δ varies: we use a greater value
δ  δe for enrollment than the value δ  δV for verification
to increase the number of reliable minutiae.
E. Optimizations
1) Restriction of fingerprint area: Since fingerprints
usually assume an oval shape, minutiae rarely occur in
Fig. 1. Distribution of minutiae positions in 82800 fingerprints and
the ellipse E from where minutiae are considered. The brightness of
pixels corresponds to the frequency of minutiae occurrence at this
position.
the corners of the image, provided that the sensor area is
sufficiently large. In order to ensure that the distribution
of the randomly selected chaff points resembles that of
genuine minutiae, we restrict both the chaff points and
the minutiae considered in the vault to an area M with
sufficiently high minutiae occurrence. Such an area was
empirically determined by a statistical evaluation of the
positions of 5.8 million minutiae extracted from 82800
imprints taken from 9200 fingers with 3 different sensors
having 500 DPI.1 It turned out that - independent of the
finger - 7{8 of all minutiae occurred in an area defined by
an ellipse E that covers approximately 87000 pixels, which
roughly corresponds to 2.25 cm2. The distribution of the
minutiae positions and the ellipse are shown in Figure 1.
Consequently, we choose minutiae and chaff points only
from the set M given by the union of these ellipses on the
considered fingers, i.e. M : tpθ, a, bq | θ ¤ f ^ pa, bq P Eu.
2) Reliability filtering during enrollment: In order to
minimize minutiae insertion and omission errors, we use
only the most reliable minutiae for the feature vector.
Several minutiae quality assessment indices have been
developed (e.g. [13] or [14]) which could be used to (a`
priori) predict the reliability of detection of the individual
minutiae. However, we anticipate that an empirical (a`
posteriori) determination of the detection reliability with a
sufficient number of samples yields better results. For this
reason, we use multiple measurements during enrollment
and consider only those minutiae in the feature vector that
have been detected in all measurements. Details are given
in Section II-F.
3) Enforcing minimum distance: Due to the deviations
in the measured minutiae locations, it can happen during
authentication that a minutia in a query fingerprint is
1The fingerprints had been collected in a previous project of the
BSI and secunet.
closer to a chaff point than to the corresponding minutiae
in the vault. Although we try to minimize these deviations
by setting the locations of the stored minutiae to their
mean value measured during enrollment, the frequency
of such assignment errors can drastically increase if the
chaff points are selected too close to genuine minutiae.
Therefore, we select the chaff points with a minimum
distance d to the genuine minutiae of the same finger with
respect to the Euclidean distance. Furthermore, in order
to prevent that an adversary can exploit this minimum
distance to distinguish chaff points from genuine minutiae,
we also enforce the minimum distance among the minutiae
and chaff points. In particular, if the Euclidean distance
between two minutiae on the same finger is smaller than d,
one of them is randomly disregarded, and chaff points are
selected with minimum Euclidean distance d to all other
chaff points and minutiae from the same finger.
4) Quality filtering during authentication: In [10], it
is shown that the achievable entropy loss of the scheme
decreases with an increase of the average number of
surplus minutiae (i.e., minutiae not matching with real
minutiae in the reference template) per query fingerprint.
The reason for this fact is that, on average, the number
of false matches of minutiae with chaff points increases
with the average number of surplus minutiae per query
fingerprint. However, an increase of false matches requires
stronger error correction by lowering the degree k of the
secret polynomial, which decreases security of the scheme
with respect to both information theoretic lower bounds
and practical attacks.
In order to limit the average number s of surplus
minutiae per query fingerprint, we filter the minutiae from
the query fingerprint using the quality index value output
by the minutiae extraction algorithm. Precisely, we define
a minimum quality value Q and provide to the matching
algorithm only those minutiae of the query fingerprint that
have a quality value of at least Q. In our concrete imple-
mentation we used the MINDTCT algorithm of NIST [13]
for minutiae extraction which outputs minutiae quality
values in the range between 0 and 1.
The motivation for the quality filtering during authen-
tication is that during enrollment only the most reliable
minutiae have been used for computing the reference tem-
plate. Since the quality values of the minutiae should pre-
dict their detection reliability, minutiae with higher quality
value are more likely to be used for template generation. In
practice, however, the quality value of a minutiae consider-
ably varies between different measurements. Furthermore,
experiments show that reliable minutiae sometimes have
small quality values. This implies that quality filtering
would not only reduce the number of false matches but
also the number of correct matches. Therefore, the extent
of filtering, i.e., the value chosen for parameter Q, must
be carefully selected based on empirical data so that the
number of correct matches is not significantly reduced.
5) Enforcement of minimum number of minutiae per
finger: One of the main sources for failures during authen-
tication is the difficulty to correctly align the query fin-
gerprints with respect to the stored minutiae. This task is
performed by the minutiae matching algorithm (described
in Section II-D) for each finger by identifying the isometry
(rotation and translation) that maximizes the number of
matches between the minutiae extracted from the query
fingerprint and the points (representing minutiae or chaff
point) stored in the reference data. However, this approach
can only be successful if the reference template contains a
sufficient number of minutiae of each finger; otherwise, i.e.,
if for one of the fingers the reference template contains only
few minutiae, the number of wrong matches (with chaff
points) resulting by chance from an incorrect isometry
may be higher than the number of matches for the correct
isometry. In practice, such cases can easily occur if one of
the fingerprints captured during enrollment is of relatively
poor quality.
For this reason, we require that the reference tem-
plate computed during authentication contains at least
χ minutiae from each finger, where χ is an additional
parameter. Since this constraint reduces the number of
possible reference templates its impact on security must
be analyzed. We provide an estimation of this reduction
in Section III-C.
6) Pre-alignment of fingers and threshold for rotation:
Multi-biometric systems are more laborious and time-
consuming for the user than single-biometric systems. This
is particularly true for the fuzzy fingerprint vault: for
security reasons (see Section II-C for a discussion), the
success of the authentication is not evaluated for each
finger individually but only for all of them together; this
implies that in case of a failure the user does not know
which of the fingerprints caused the authentication to
fail and, hence, he is forced to re-capture all fingers.
However, the following discussion shows that poor quality
fingerprints can be quite reliably detected even before the
polynomial reconstruction is started.
Our matching algorithm does not rely on a correct align-
ment of the query fingerprint in relation to the minutiae
set contained in the reference template, but it identifies
an isometry (rotation and translation) between the set
of minutiae of the query fingerprint and the points of
the reference template so that the number of matches is
maximized. In most cases this approach works well and the
matching algorithm outputs many more correct matches
than false matches (with chaff points) which indicates that
the isometry identified represents the correct alignment
of the fingerprints quite exactly. However, in some few
cases the number of wrong matches is greater than the
number of correct matches, which typically results in a
failure to recover the secret polynomial. Our analysis of
more than 160 tests performed shows that in most of
these cases the rotation applied by the matching algorithm
was extraordinarily large, indicating that the identified
Fig. 2. Uneven distribution of the pixels between the pairs of
opposed quadrants triggering a rotation counterclockwise.
isometry was incorrect.
This observation shows that a threshold for the rota-
tion identified by the matching algorithm could be used
to detect poor quality fingerprints that result in failed
verifications. However, in order to maximize the efficiency
of this approach, we should try to minimize the magnitude
of the rotation in the correct isometry, i.e., the isometry
that correctly maps the minutiae of the query fingerprint
to the minutiae in the reference template. We do so by pre-
aligning the fingerprints before the minutiae are extracted.
Several approaches have been proposed for this task, in
particular the detection of singular points (e.g., [15]) or the
additional storage of supplementing alignment data (e.g.,
[16], [17]). However, alignment data may reveal informa-
tion about the minutiae and singular point detection is
quite complex. Therefore, we decided to follow a different
approach which is simple and does not require the storage
of additional reference data.
Our pre-alignment algorithm scales down the fingerprint
image and uses a threshold on pixel brightness to obtain an
image displaying the shape of the fingerprint as black area.
Furthermore, the image is shifted so that the centroid of all
black pixels matches the image center. Then it iteratively
performs the following step:
If the sum of black pixels in the upper left and the
lower right quadrant exceeds the number of black pixels in
the lower left and the upper right quadrant, the image is
rotated clockwise by 1; else, it is rotated counterclockwise
by 1. Following each rotation the wedge at the lower end
resulting from the rotation is removed by horizontal crop-
ping. The evaluation criteria for the rotation is illustrated
in Figure 2.
The iteration stops as soon as the direction of rotation
changes. Finally, the aggregated rotations are applied to
the original fingerprint image.
F. Enrollment
Let f ¥ 2 be the number of fingers used per person, q a
prime power, k   t   r ¤ q, and χ ¤ t{f . For each user, a
random polynomial P of degree less than k over the finite
field Fq is selected. The coefficients of this polynomial
represent the secret of the scheme. Then, for each finger
u imprints are taken and the minutiae correspondences
between these instances are identified using the matching
algorithm (Algorithm 1) with tolerance parameter δ  δe.
Minutiae outside the considered set M, i.e., with position
outside the ellipse E on the respective finger, are neglected
(see Section II-E1). Then, t of those minutiae that have
been detected in all u imprints of the respective finger
are selected at random so that at least χ minutiae are
taken from each finger and each pair of chosen minutiae
has a minimum distance of d. This set T of t reliable
minutiae can be considered the biometric template to be
protected by the fuzzy vault scheme. The template T is
amended with random chaff points, resulting in a set R
of r points containing t genuine minutiae and r  t chaff
points, so that each point in R has a minimum distance of
d to all other points from the same finger. Furthermore,
in order to ensure that minutiae and chaff points within
the vault are not distinguishable by their order, they are
lexicographically ordered.
In contrast to the original fuzzy vault scheme [3], the
secret polynomial is redundantly encoded not by eval-
uating it on the biometric data itself but only on the
minutiae’s indexes in the ordered list. Precisely, for all
1 ¤ i ¤ r we (re-)define xi  Epiq, where E is an
injective embedding from the set t1, . . . , ru  Z to Fq.
(For instance, if q is prime we could set Epiq : i mod q.)
Further, we set yi  P pxjq, if mi is a genuine minutia,
and choose a random value yi  P pxjq, if mi is a chaff
point, where j is the index of mi after applying the
lexicographic order. This optimization allows a reduction
of the field size to the range of r. The vault Y is given by
the ordered list of minutiae and chaff points, paired with
the corresponding yj values. The vault and a hash value H
of the polynomial’s coefficients are stored in the database.
A pseudo code description of the enrollment is given in
Algorithm 2. There h denotes a collision resistant hash
function. Furthermore, both minutiae and chaff points are
denoted as m  pθ, a, bq, where θ is an index of the finger
and pa, bq are the Cartesian coordinates of its location
in the image. We define the distance ||m  m1|| of two
minutiae on the same finger as the Euclidean distance of
their location.
G. Recovery of the polynomial
The unlocking of the vault (during authentication) re-
quires the recovery of the secret polynomial P from a set
of points pxji , yjiq, some of which (those resulting from
correct matches with minutiae) lie on the polynomial, while
others (resulting from false matches with chaff points)
do not. For this task, a Reed-Solomon decoder RSDe-
code is used that receives as input a set of w points
pxj1 , yj1q, . . . , pxjw , yjwq P F2q with w ¥ k and outputs
e0, . . . , ek1 P t0, . . . , q  1u, so that yji  P pxjiq holds
for at least k of the pxji , yjiq with P pzq 
°k1
i0 eiz
i, if
such a polynomial exists. We assume that the Peterson-
Berlekamp-Massey-decoder is used as suggested in [3].
This technique is successful, if at least pw  kq{2 of the w
Algorithm 2 Enrollment
Select a random polynomial P pzq  °k1i0 eizi over Fq.
for θ  1 to f do
Take u imprints of finger θ and pre-align them (see
Section II-E6)
Extract the corresponding sets Mθ,1, . . . ,Mθ,u of
minutiae.
for j  2 to u do
Find correspondences between Mθ,1 and Mθ,j using
Algorithm 1 with δ  δe.
end for
Identify the set Aθ of reliable minutiae that are
present in all u imprints.
for all Minutiae m P Aθ do
Set m  pθ, a, bq, where pa, bq is the mean value of
its location over the u measurements.
end for
Remove all pθ, a, bq from Aθ with pa, bq R E .
while two minutiae have distance smaller than d do
Randomly remove one of them.
end while
if |Aθ|   χ then
Repeat capture process for finger θ.
end if
end for
Set A  θ Aθ as the set of all reliable minutiae.
if |A|   t then
return “ERROR: Not enough reliable minutiae”
end if
Randomly select T  tm1, . . . ,mtu  A so that T
contains at least χ minutiae for each finger.
Randomly select r t chaff points mt 1, . . . ,mr so that
||mi mj || ¥ d for all 1 ¤ i   j ¤ r.
Compute the lexicographic order pmj1 , . . . ,mjr q of R 
tm1, . . . ,mru.
for i  1 to r do
if mji is a genuine minutia, i.e., ji ¤ t then
Set yi  P pxiq with xi  Epiq.
else
Select a random yi  P pxiq P Fq.
end if
end for
Set Y  pmj1 , y1, . . . ,mjr , yrq.
Compute H : hpe0|| . . . ||ek1q, where || denotes con-
catenation.
Store Y and H in database.
points handed over to the decoder are correct. Although
there are Reed-Solomon-Decoders that can decode with
only
?
wk correct points, they do not offer any advantage
for the fuzzy vault, because for typical parameters
?
wk
is quite close to pw   kq{2, and they are computationally
much less efficient (see [3]).
As pointed out in [4], the Reed Solomon Decoding
degenerates to a brute-force polynomial interpolation for
w  k. Previous implementations of the fuzzy fingerprint
vault [4], [5], [6] have used this brute-force approach for
decoding. However, numerical evaluation reported in [10]
revealed that setting w  2mc  k and k  mc  mf
can provide a good balance between efficient decoding and
security, where mc and mf are the expected numbers of
correct and false matches, respectively. However, if the
match rate disperses considerably, it may by necessary to
slightly deviate from this value, in order to reduce the False
Rejection Rate. As we will see in Section IV-B, this is the
case.
H. Authentication
We only implement an authentication in the verification
scenario, where the identity of the (alleged) user is known
a priori.
In order to verify the identity of a user, a query fin-
gerprint is taken for each considered finger. The minutiae
are extracted and matched with the minutiae and chaff
points m contained in the vault stored for the alleged
user. The indices of those minutiae and chaff points in
the vault matching with minutiae in the query fingerprint
are identified; along with the corresponding yi values they
are given to RSDecode (see Section II-G) to recover the
secret polynomial P . If the number of genuine minutiae
among these points is sufficiently high (see Section II-G for
a discussion), the polynomial can be recovered. Finally, the
correctness of the recovered polynomial is verified using
the hash value stored in the database. Optionally, the
secret key (given by the coefficients of the recovered poly-
nomial) can be used for further cryptographic applications,
e.g., as seed in a key derivation function.
A pseudo code description of the verification is given
as Algorithm 3. The tolerance parameter δv used for the
minutiae matching algorithm can differ from that used
during enrollment.
III. Security analysis
In this contribution we consider the security of the fuzzy
vault for multiple fingerprints with respect to attacks that
try to recover the minutiae or, equivalently, the secret
polynomial from the vault. It is understood that there
are other types of attacks against biometric template
protection schemes to which the fuzzy vault is susceptible
[18]. In particular, the cross matching of the vaults from
several independent enrollments of a user represents a se-
rious threat to the fuzzy vault. However, a comprehensive
analysis of all potential attacks against the fuzzy vault
would go beyond the scope of this paper.
A. Provable Security
In [10], lower bounds on the security of the fuzzy
fingerprint vault were deducted. In particular, for the
case r  q and χ  0, an upper bound was given for
Algorithm 3 Verification of a user’s identity
Select Y and H stored in database for this user
Set I  H.
for θ  1 to f do
Identify in Y the subset Rθ of minutiae and chaff
points on finger θ.
Take a query fingerprint for finger θ and pre-align it
as described in Section II-E6.
Extract the set Mθ of minutiae with quality value at
least Q (see Section II-E4).
Find correspondences between Rθ and Mθ using Al-
gorithm 1 with δ  δv.
for all m P Rθ, which have matched a minutia in Mθ
do
Add pxi, yiq to I, where xi  Epiq and i is the index
of m in Y .
end for
end for
for all Subsets Z of I with cardinality x do
Start RSDecode on input Z (see Section II-G).
if RSDecode outputs e¯0, . . . , e¯k1. then
if H¯  hpe¯0|| . . . ||e¯k1q  H then
return “Verification successful”.
Optional: Return e¯0|| . . . ||e¯k1.
Stop algorithm.
end if
end if
end for
return “Verification not successful”
the success probability of any algorithm that takes as
input the vault Y and tries to output the corresponding
secret polynomial or the corresponding template T . The
analysis conducted in [10] revealed that a security of at
least 50 bits can only be achieved if the match rate, i.e.,
the rate of minutiae in the vault matched with the query
fingerprints during verification, exceeds a certain minimum
value which depends on the average number s of surplus
minutiae (i.e. the minutiae that do not match with a
genuine minutia in the template) per query fingerprint and
on the tolerance parameter δv used for matching during
verification.
B. Existing attacks
The most efficient method to recover the minutiae or
secret polynomial from the vault was published by Mi-
hailescu [8]. This brute force attack is designed to break
the implementations of [4], [5] and [6]; in the context of our
scheme it is even slightly more efficient as the correctness
of the recovered polynomial can be verified using the hash
value of the secret coefficients and does not require addi-
tional evaluations of the polynomial. With this adaptation
the attack systematically searches through all subsets
ti1, . . . , iku of t1, . . . , ru, computes the unique polynomial
P satisfying P pEpijqq  yij by Lagrange interpolation,
and checks the correctness of this polynomial with the
stored hash value. According to [8], the number of trials
needed is 1.1pr{tqk and each trial requires 6.5k log2 pkq
arithmetic operations over Fq.
2 However, in the latter
estimation an explicit constant of 18 for multiplication
of the polynomials (see Corollary 8.19 in [19]) has been
overlooked, and thus, we end up with a total number of
approximately 129k log2 pkqpr{tqk arithmetic operations.
If the number of chaff points is close to the maximum
possible, the attack described in [20] can be more efficient
than brute force. The basic idea is that the free area
around chaff points is smaller than around genuine minu-
tia. Assuming a density 0.45 for random sphere packings
[4], the maximum number of chaff points per finger would
be 0.45 87000{Vd, where Vd is the number of integer point
in the sphere of radius d.
Another threat to the fuzzy fingerprint vault is the
fingerprint dictionary attack, where an attacker simulates
verification with the vault using a large number of real
or artificial fingerprints. If the templates are chosen ac-
cording to a realistic distribution, the success probability
of each attempt equals the False Accept Rate (FAR) and
the attacker needs pFARq1 trials on average. Therefore,
if a single simulation of verification takes C computa-
tional steps, the attack’s running time is C  pFARq1.
Note, that simulation involves templates extraction and
minutiae matching, which are computationally much more
expensive than a polynomial interpolation.
Unfortunately, determination of very small FAR values
is computationally very expensive: While the FAR for the
multi-finger setting (i.e. for f ¥ 2) can be extrapolated
from the FAR of a single-finger setting, determination
of latter one requires considerably more than FAR1
matching operations and must be performed for each set
of parameters individually. For the security level we aim
at, this already takes more time than we have available for
this publication. Therefore, we do not evaluate the security
with respect to the fingerprint dictionary attack, but leave
this task to a future publication.
C. Entropy loss by the minimum number of minutiae per
finger
Whereas the enforcement of a minimum number χ of
minutiae per finger (see Section II-E5) aims at reducing
the false rejection rate it also decreases the security of the
scheme by narrowing the set of possible templates. This
applies to the lower bound on attacks according to [10]
as well as to the practical attack of [8]. The subsequent
analysis quantifies this reduction of security.
We will assume that the minutiae chosen are indepen-
dently and uniformly distributed among the F fingers.
This assumption can be fulfilled by a suitable probabilistic
2In fact, the number of trials needed is considerably higher, as the
estimate
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  1.1pr{tqk used in [8] for r ¡ t ¡ 5 does not hold
true.
selection method of the template T from the set of reliable
minutiae during enrollment.
Using this assumption and the inclusion-exclusion-
principle, we can estimate the probability ζpt, χq that a
template with t minutiae includes for each finger f at least
χ minutiae by
ζpt, χq  1 ft
f¸
θ1
p1qθ

f
θ



χ¸
i1,...,iθ0

t
i1, . . . iθ, t
°
j ij


pf  θqt
°
j ij ,
where
 
a
b1,...,bm

with b1        bm  a denotes the
multinomial coefficient.
On the other hand, the conditional probability p that
a particular instance of a template T is chosen, if a
minimum number of χ minutiae per finger is enforced, can
be calculated from the probability p1 that this instance is
chosen, if no minimum number of minutiae per finger is
enforced, by the equation p  p1{ζpt, χq. Therefore, the
entropy H8pTχq of a template chosen with a minimum
number of minutiae per finger is exactly log ζpt, χq smaller
than the entropy of a template chosen without a minimum
number of minutiae per finger.
For practical attacks, the search space is narrowed by
the factor ζpt, χq; thus, the best known attack could
be adapted to require at most 129ζpt, χqk log2 pkqpr{tqk
operations.
IV. Results
In this section, we summarize the results of empirical
parameter evaluations, the impact of the individual opti-
mizations, and the general performance of the scheme.
We used a test set of 864 fingerprints taken from 18
persons in the course of this research using an optical
sensor, each person providing 6 imprints of 8 fingers (little
fingers were excluded). In our experiments, we used 6 or
all 8 fingers per person (without or with thumbs), but
results referring to single fingers were averaged over all
finger types.
For minutiae extraction, we used the MINDTCT algo-
rithm of NIST [13]. We stress that other feature extraction
algorithms may exhibit a different performance, and there-
fore, the resulting statistics may deviate from ours.
A. Size of feature vector
First, we determined how large the feature vector can
be in dependence of the number u of measurements and
the tolerance parameter δe used during enrollment. We did
this by evaluating the number of minutiae per finger that
are reliably (i.e., u times) detected in u measurements.
Since this number varies considerably among individuals
and measurements, acceptable Failure To Enroll (FTE)
rates can only be achieved, if the required number of
reliable minutiae is considerably lower than its average
value. Therefore, we evaluated the maximum number Mr
TABLE I
Number Mr of reliable minutiae per finger that is found in
80% of all measurements.
u δe  5 δe  7 δe  10 δe  15
1 63 63 63 63
2 23 32 39 43
3 18 24 31 35
4 9 16 22 27
5 6 9 15 18
of reliable minutiae that is achieved in at least 80% of all
measurements. The results of this evaluation are listed in
Table I.
In the multi-biometric setting, a single finger having
only few reliable minutiae can be compensated by the
others. However, in the case of only two fingers, this effect
is smaller than for f ¥ 3. Moreover, if an individual
generally has low quality fingerprints, e.g. due to skin
abrasion, cuts or dry skin, the probabilities that several
fingers have few reliable minutiae are dependent and do
not multiply. Therefore, the required number of reliable
minutiae should be carefully selected based on empirical
evaluation of the resulting enrollment error rates.
Due to the small number of reliable minutiae for u  5,
we generally recommend to set u ¤ 4.
B. Minutiae matching rates
In order to configure the error correction capabilities of
our scheme appropriately, it is necessary to determine the
rate at which the genuine minutiae in the vault are iden-
tified during authentication. For various tolerance param-
eters δv  δe, we computed the biometric template set T ,
containing t minutiae reliably detected in u measurements,
and matched them with the minutiae of an (independent)
query fingerprint using our matching algorithm. We did
not add chaff points to the template T . The average match
rate, i.e. the average ratio between the number of matches
found and t, are given in Table II.
Similarly to the number of reliable minutiae, the match
rate varies considerably between different measurements.
Moreover, in the presence of chaff points, the match rates
slightly decrease depending on the expected number of
false matches (with chaff points), as the chaff points render
the correct mapping of the minutiae more difficult for the
matching algorithm. (This aspect is further discussed in
Section IV-F.) Therefore, a reasonably small FRR can
only be achieved if k is selected slightly smaller than the
TABLE II
Average match rate (in percentage) in the absence of chaff
points for δe  δv.
u δv  5 δv  7 δv  10 δv  15
1 40 50 58 64
2 66 72 78 82
3 75 81 84 87
4 81 85 88 90
5 85 89 91 92
TABLE III
Expected number of minutiae in a query fingerprint after
filtering with minimum quality value Q.
Minimum quality Q Av. no. τ of minutiae
0 70
0.1 67
0.2 52
0.3 48
0.4 41
0.5 33
0.6 32
expected value of mcmf (see Section II-G). Our empirical
evaluation suggests to set k 10%-20% smaller than this
value.
For 2 ¤ u ¤ 4, we obtain good match rates at a reason-
able number of minutiae. Therefore, we will subsequently
focus on these cases.
C. Effect of quality filtering during verification
As argued in Section II-E4, quality filtering of the
minutiae in the query fingerprints aims to reduce the
number of surplus minutiae, i.e., minutiae in the query
fingerprints that do not match with genuine minutiae in T .
We evaluated the effectiveness and eligible configuration of
the filtering based on the minutiae quality values output
by the MINDTCT algorithm of NIST [13].
A statistic evaluation on our test set revealed that the
distribution of the minutiae quality values output by the
MINDTCT is very uneven; values in certain ranges occur
very frequently while others (e.g., between 0.5 and 0.57)
are almost never assumed.
The average number of minutiae detected in a single
fingerprint depends on the sensor used, the feature ex-
tractor algorithms, the quality of the images, and even the
finger type (e.g. thumbs contain more minutiae than other
fingers). In our tests, we detected an average number of 84
minutiae per fingerprint (excluding thumbs) inside ellipse
E . Based on this number and the distribution of quality
values, we can estimate the expected number τ of minutiae
in a query fingerprint after filtering with minimum quality
value Q. The results are listed in Table III.
The reduced average number τ of minutiae per query
finger given to the matching algorithm results in a de-
creased average number s of surplus minutiae per finger
and in less false matches (i.e., matches with chaff points).
On the other hand, it may also reduce the number of
correct matches (and likewise the match rate) because the
minutiae filtered out could have matched with genuine
minutiae in the vault. For different sets of parameters
we empirically determined the decrease of the number
of correct and false matches resulting from the quality
filtering. An example plot is presented in Figure 3.
For larger r and smaller δv, quality filtering with higher
values of Q results in a more drastic reduction of the
correct matches. Nevertheless, for various parameters we
consistently found a value Q between 0.2 and 0.3 to be
Fig. 3. Reduction of the correct and false matches by quality filtering
for f  6, t  120, r  400 and δv  7.
optimal, reducing the false matches by approximately 30%
while decreasing the number of correct matches by less
than 3%.
D. Effect of minimum number of minutiae per finger
If the tolerance parameter δv is set appropriately as
described in Section IV-F, the number of correct matches
typically exceeds the number of false matches. On the
other hand, if the matching algorithm fails to identify
the correct isometry, the number of correct matches is
typically significantly lower than the number of false
matches. As explained in Section II-E5, the enforcement
of a minimum number χ of minutiae per finger in the
template T aims at reducing the frequency of such cases.
We evaluated the effectiveness and reasonable configu-
ration of this optimization by determining the ratio of
fingers for which the number of false matches exceeded
the number of correct matches for various values of the
parameter χ. Furthermore, we analyzed the influence of
this optimization to the FTE by determining the rate at
which a finger contained at least χ minutiae and, hence,
would succeeded to enroll. The results of this evaluation
are displayed in Figure 4 by the curves of the match
rate and the rate of successful enrollment. (Other failures
of enrollment, particularly cases, where the fingers of
a person contained less than t minutiae in total, were
neglected.) Obviously, χ  9 already yields a considerable
improvement with only moderately increased FTE rates.
The impact of the value of χ becomes particularly strong
as the average number of false matches approaches the
number of correct matches. As shown in Figure 5 for f  6,
u  4, t  100, r  600, δe  10, δv  7 and Q  0.3,
where even for χ  15 the fraction between the average
numbers of correct and false matches was 2.1 (as opposed
to a fraction of 2.9 for the parameters of Figure 4), the
average match rate steadily and considerably increases
until χ  15. The decrease of the successful enrollment
rate is similar to the case of Figure 4. This finding indicates
that in these cases it may be worth to choose χ larger than
Fig. 4. Impact of enforcing a minimum number χ of minutiae per
finger in T to match rate and rate of successful enrollment for f  6,
u  4, t  120, r  400, δe  10, δv  7 and Q  0.
9 at the cost of higher FTE rates.
E. Effect of pre-alignment of fingerprints
We evaluated the impact of the pre-alignment of the
fingerprints on our test set. We used two sets of parameters
with 6 fingers (f  6), the first one being f  6, u  4,
t  120, r  400, χ  15 and δv  7 and the second one
being f  6, u  4, t  100, r  455, χ  13 and δv  5.
On average, the pre-alignment reduced the absolute
rotation identified by the minutiae matching algorithm
from 4.3 to 2.7. Much more important than that is
the increasing correlation of a failure of the matching
algorithm to correctly map the minutiae sets (resulting in
more false than correct matches) to the size of the rotation
angle. This allows setting up a threshold for the absolute
rotation to reliably detect and reject individual query
fingerprints for which the minutiae matching algorithm
could not determine the correct mapping. In empirical
tests, we evaluated the impact of the pre-alignment to
the reliability at which a rotation threshold can sort out
“bad” fingerprints that contribute more false than correct
Fig. 5. Impact of enforcing a minimum number χ of minutiae per
finger in T to match rate and rate of successful enrollment for f  6,
u  4, t  100, r  600, δe  10, δv  7 and Q  0.3.
matches. Without the pre-alignment, a rotation threshold
of 10 rejected 86% of those “bad” fingerprints, at the
cost of 35% false positives, i.e. “good” fingerprints being
rejected. In contrast, when using the pre-alignment de-
scribed in Section II-E6, a rotation threshold of 8 rejected
100% of the “bad” fingerprints at the cost of only 20% false
positives.
F. Balancing correct and false matches
In order to enable the minutiae matching algorithm
to determine the correct isometry by which the query
fingerprint is correctly aligned to the minutiae in the vault,
we must ensure that, on average, the number of correct
matches considerably exceeds the number of false matches.
The results of Section IV-D indicate that a fraction of 2
between the average numbers of correct and false matches
already requires large values for χ which considerably
increases the FTE.
In [10], the expected number mf of false matches
is estimated by pr  tqsVδv{|E |, where Vδ  1  
4
°rδ1s
i1
P?
δ2  i2T is the number of integer points in
the 2-dimensional plane with Euclidean norm smaller
than δ and s is the average number of surplus minutiae
(i.e., minutiae not matching with genuine minutiae) per
query fingerprint. On the other hand, we can estimate
s  τ  µt{f , where τ is the average number of minutiae
per query fingerprint after quality filtering.
Our experiments show that for typical parameters the
average number of false matches is 20%-60% larger than
these estimations imply, depending on the specific param-
eters. The deviation is presumably due to those outliers
resulting from an incorrect determination of the isometry:
if the matching algorithm is unable to detect the correct
alignment, its optimization strategy with respect to the
number of matches will yield extraordinary many false
matches. Based on this observation, we adjust our above
estimation to
mf  1.4pr  tqpτ  µt{fqVδv{|E |. (1)
Yet, we expect the number of false matches to grow
linearly with Vδv , which is a quadratic function in δv.
On the other hand, the average number mc of correct
matches is given by µt, where µ is the match rate, and
therefore, grows slowly with increasing δv as shown in
Table II. Therefore, the selection of δv should carefully
balance the expected numbers of correct and false matches.
For f  3, u  4, t  66, r  320 and Q  0.3, and for
5 ¤ δv ¤ 15 we estimated the number of false matches
by (1) and the number of correct matches as µt using
the match rates empirically determined. The results show
that, for these parameters, δv ¤ 8 should be selected to
ensure that the average number of correct matches is at
least twice the number of correct matches.
For a smaller ratio r{t, the curves meet at higher values
of δv, but still the accelerating growth of the number of
false matches implies that δv ¤ 8 is a good choice.
Fig. 6. Impact of the tolerance parameter δv on the estimated
average number of correct and false matches for f  3, u  4, t  66,
r  320 and Q  0, 3.
G. Provable security
In [10], minimum match rates are estimated that are
necessary to provide provable security based on the lower
bounds given in [11]. These minimum match rates depend
on the tolerance parameter δv and the number s of surplus
minutiae in the query fingerprint (i.e., the minutiae not
matching with genuine minutiae of the template) by which
the number of false matches is estimated. A compari-
son of these minimum match rates with the empirically
determined rates in Table II (which have been roughly
confirmed in the presence of chaff points with appropriate
optimizations applied) shows that in practice a provable
secure fuzzy fingerprint vault could only be possible for
δv ¤ 7 and s ¤ 20. As argued in Section IV-F we can
estimate s  τµt{f , where τ is the number of minutiae of
the query fingerprint after quality filtering. Furthermore,
the results of Section IV-C show that quality filtering
should not be expected to reduce τ significantly below
48. This implies that s  20 can only be achieved for
µt{f ¥ 28. However, evaluation of the values t{f and µ
given in Tables I and II, respectively, for δv ¤ 7 reveals
that this condition is only met for u ¤ 2, where the
match rates are much lower than the minimum match rates
derived in [10].
Furthermore, as argued in Section IV-F, the false match
rates observed in practice are 20% to 60% higher than the
estimation in [10] would imply. This means that the value
for s must even be decreased to 12-17 to obtain provable
security with the minimum match rates given for s  20.
As a summary, we conclude that provable security seems
out of reach, unless the average number of surplus minutiae
per query fingerprint can be further reduced by improved
quality filtering methods.
H. Selection of parameters
For the selection of eligible parameters for a fuzzy fin-
gerprint vault secure against existing attacks, we suggest
the following method:
1) Define the number of fingers used.
2) Set the number of captures per finger for enrollment
to u  3 or, preferably, u  4.
3) Choose δe between 5 and 15, and t ¤ fMrpδeq,
where Mrpδeq is the number of reliable minutiae for
δe indicated in Table I. The choice of δe and t should
be carefully tested with respect to the FTE rate.
4) Choose δv between 5 and 7. Smaller values may
drastically reduce the match rates, which makes
it difficult to achieve a high security level. (Note,
that setting δv much smaller than δe may result
in smaller match rates than indicated in Table II.)
Larger values will result in too many false matches
(see Section IV-F).
5) Set the minimum distance d between the minutiae
and chaff points in the template to approximately
p3{2qδv to reduce the probability that a minutiae in
the query fingerprint is closer to a chaff point than
to its counterpart in T .
6) Set Q between 0.2 and 0.3.
7) For a broad range of values for r, numerically esti-
mate the expected numbers mc and mf of correct
and false matches, respectively, by µt and (1) using
match rate µ indicated for the selected u and δv in
Table II and the estimate τ  50. Then, for each
value of r set k 10%-25% smaller than mc  mf
(see Section IV-B) and compute the security against
existing attacks as 129ζpt, χqk log2 pkqpr{tqk. Select
the pair r, k for which the security is maximized.
8) Select χ  9, if the fraction between the estimates for
the average number of correct and false matches is at
least 2.7. Otherwise, increase χ up to 15, depending
on this fraction. However, ensure that the fraction is
at least 2, if necessary, by decreasing r or δv.
9) If the maximum security determined is higher than
the level aimed at, lower r and k to reduce the false
rejection rate (FRR), and decrease t to reduce the
failure to enroll (FTE) rate.
10) Empirically evaluate the average number of correct
and false matches. If these numbers significantly
deviate from the estimations used in the previous
step, repeat this step with appropriate correction
factors.
Based on our statistical data and the method described
above, the example parameters listed in Table IV have
been determined to provide the indicated security level
against existing attacks. We did not experimentally deter-
mine real error rates during enrollment and verification;
therefore, these parameters are mere suggestions which
require practical validation. We set d  t3{2  δvu, Q 
0.3 and, as the fraction computed in step 8 above was
always greater than 3, χ  9. Furthermore, we choose
r   t0.287000{Vdu, which is less than half of the maximum
value possible, to avoid the attack described in [20] (see
Section III-B) that could significantly reduce security.
TABLE IV
Parameters for a security level of 2Sec.
f u δe δv t r k Sec
2 2 7 5 62 240 27 68
3 2 7 5 90 202 45 69
3 2 7 5 90 351 41 97
3 3 7 5 70 360 34 97
I. Practical evaluation
In order to test the performance of our fuzzy fingerprint
vault and its optimizations under realistic circumstances,
we enrolled 10 persons using 6 fingers (i.e., f  6) using
the parameters u  4, t  120, r  400, k  53, δe 
10, δv  7, χ  15 and Q  0.3. For these parameters,
the best known attack requires 2100 operations; thus, a
security equivalent to 100 bit keys is achieved. For the
persons that had been successfully enrolled, we performed
a verification. As capture device, we used an optical multi-
finger sensor (Cross Match L SCAN Guardian), the NBIS
package of NIST (in particular, NFSEG and MINDTCT)
[13] for fingerprint segmentation and feature extraction.
First, we evaluated the performance of the enrollment
by its FTE and duration. It was aborted after 3 unsuc-
cessful attempts per finger and the FTE was computed
as the fraction of aborted enrollments. Furthermore, we
determined the average number of retries (repetition of
capturing) needed per user (summed up for all fingers)
and the time needed.
In order to assess the reliability of the verification, we
evaluated the FRR (without any repeated attempts). The
FAR for this small sample was zero.
We performed the simulation for two versions of the
scheme independently: the first simulation was performed
for a basic version without the quality filtering of the minu-
tiae during verification (Section II-E4), the pre-alignment
of fingerprints (Section II-E6), and the enforcement of a
minimum number of minutiae per finger in the template
(Section II-E5). The second version implemented these
optimizations. The results of the simulation are listed in
Table V.
V. Conclusions
Our analysis shows that a fuzzy vault for multiple
fingerprints can be very secure against template recovery
from the helper data, if appropriate optimizations are
3The only failed verification succeeded in the second attempt.
TABLE V
Performance of the scheme in a simulation with 10 persons.
Duration is given in minutes.
Enrollment Verification
FTE Retries Duration FRR
Basic 20% 0.5 2.1 25%
Optimized 0% 2 3.5 10%3
applied. Filtering minutiae for reliability during enroll-
ment and for quality during verification turn out to be
particularly effective. Furthermore, enforcing a minimum
number of minutiae per finger in the template significantly
increases matching performance. Both optimizations are
very sensitive to the respective thresholds, which must be
carefully set on the basis of empirical data. Interestingly,
we were able to solve the fingerprint alignment problem
using a simple algorithm and without storing additional
helper data or using singular point detection.
Although we did not achieve match rates required to
prove the security by information theoretic arguments as
discussed in [10], we can obtain a security level against
existing attacks of 270 for two fingers and of 297 for three
fingers.
Our simulation of enrollment and verification indicates
that the scheme can be effective and efficient in practice.
The process of capturing several fingers can be facilitated
using multi-finger sensors. Nevertheless, the parameters
need to be selected with care to reduce the error rates
and effort for enrollment. Furthermore, simulation tests
on a larger scale would be needed to obtain more reliable
data on achievable error rates. In particular, it would be
interesting to investigate the fraction of fingers or persons
that consistently fail to provide a sufficient number of
reliable minutiae.
Finally, we would like to stress that our security analysis
only covered template recovery attacks. Other types of
attacks have been published [18] and need to be addressed
before the scheme can be considered ready for use. We
encourage research on methods to harden the fuzzy fin-
gerprint vault against these attacks.
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